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Previous studies in the social anxiety arena have shown an impaired attentional control
system, similar to that found in trait anxiety. However, the effect of task demands on
social anxiety in socially threatening stimuli, such as angry faces, remains unseen. In
the present study, 54 university students scoring high and low in the Social Interaction
and Performance Anxiety and Avoidance Scale (SIPAAS) questionnaire, participated in a
target letter discrimination task while task-irrelevant face stimuli (angry, disgust, happy,
and neutral) were simultaneously presented. The results showed that high (compared to
low) socially anxious individuals were more prone to distraction by task-irrelevant stimuli,
particularly under high perceptual load conditions. More importantly, for such individuals,
the accuracy proportions for angry faces significantly differed between the low and high
perceptual load conditions, which is discussed in light of current evolutionary models of
social anxiety.
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Introduction
Emotion and attention share important evolutionary-driven functions and are interconnected in the
sense that they both deal with information processing priorities (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987).
Threatening stimuli that are deeply rooted in evolution, such as angry faces (for reviews, see Öhman,
2009; Öhman et al., 2012), seem to have a unique status in such interactions. Such face threat laden
stimuli engage evolutionary shaped behavior systems and show more persistent conditioned fear
responding (e.g., Öhman et al., 1985), heightened psychophysiological responses (e.g., Öhman and
Soares, 1994), and attentional priority in visual search settings (e.g., Öhman et al., 2010).
Individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD), who are highly fear of negative social interactions
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association
[APA], 2013), are particularly sensitive to threat in faces, as a result of their increased sensitivity
for facial signals of social dominance (e.g., Öhman, 1986). There is mounting evidence from a wide
range of tasks and methodologies showing that both clinical and non-clinical individuals with social
anxiety show a cognitive bias in processing social information, such as an enhanced automatic
processing of angry faces (for reviews, see Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Staugaard, 2010; Morrison and
Heimberg, 2013; Schulz et al., 2013). In fact, the central tenet of several models of anxiety is to
attribute the etiology and maintenance of SAD to the automatic processing of social threat signals in
faces (for a review, see Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). For instance, according to one of the dominant
cognitive models of SAD, proposed by Rapee and Heimberg (1997), socially anxious individuals
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automatically direct their attention to potentially threatening
stimuli, such as negative faces, which then serves to maintain
their anxiety since they confirm their social fears by the elaborate
processing of the fear signals in the environment.
Automatic information processing is assumed to be fast, invol-
untary and non-strategical, as opposed to goal-directed behavior,
which is dependent on top-down attentional control (e.g., Yantis,
1993). The demands of the task determine the extent to which we
employ attentional control, i.e., attend goal-relevant stimuli at the
expense of irrelevant stimuli (e.g., Lavie et al., 2004). According
to the attentional control theory (ACT; Eysenck et al., 2007),
performance in demanding tasks should be hinder in individuals
with deficits in attentional control, as it is the case with anxious
individuals. Indeed, the optimal strategy for anxious individuals
is to allocate more attentional resources to process a great amount
of information, as this increases the likelihood of detecting threat-
related information (e.g., Öhman, 1986; Rapee and Heimberg,
1997;Williams et al., 1997;Mogg andBradley, 1998). Such strategy
results in a lower efficiency in inhibiting task-irrelevant stimuli
(Berggren and Derakshan, 2013). However, although the ACT
predicts that anxious individuals, compared to low anxious peo-
ple, allocate more attentional resources to overcome their atten-
tional control deficits, the theory does not directly address if or
how deficits in attentional control in anxiety are dependent on the
perceptual load of the task at hand. Instead, the cognitive demands
have been assessed by including a secondary task or by increasing
the amount of information in workingmemory tasks (e.g., Moriya
and Sugiura, 2012).
According to the work developed by Lavie (1995, 2005), stimuli
that are task-irrelevant (distractors) are not processed beyond a
fairly superficial level when perceptual resources are fully occu-
pied in an ongoing task. In contrast, when the perceptual load
involved in the task is low, and perceptual capacities involved
in the task are not exhausted, there are more resources available
for processing the distractors. Accordingly, previous studies have
showed that at high perceptual load, processing emotional facial
information unrelated to the task is prevented (e.g., Pessoa et al.,
2005; Bishop et al., 2007; Lim et al., 2008). However, a different
set of studies have shown the opposite pattern of results, i.e., face
distractors are prioritized irrespective of the perceptual load of the
task (e.g., Vuilleumier et al., 2001), with the underlying interpre-
tation of the data being based on the biological significance of the
face stimuli (e.g., Öhman et al., 2012). In fact, cognitive models
of anxiety predict a mandatory process of threatening stimuli
in anxious individuals, even under high task demands (Eysenck
et al., 2007).
Although several studies have indicated an impaired attentional
control in anxious individuals (e.g., Berggren and Derakshan,
2013), research investigating if the processing of task-irrelevant
stimuli is affected by the task demands is scant, particularly in
the social anxiety domain. A recent study with SAD patients
(compared to controls) showed that specific differences in brain
responses to threatening facial stimuli were relatively immune to
task implicit or explicit task requirements (designed to manipu-
late the focus of attention). More importantly, such differences
were more pronounced when the face stimuli were task-irrelevant
(Straube et al., 2011). However, this study did not investigate the
efficiency of processing task-irrelevant stimuli, which could be
done by varying the perceptual load imposed by the main task
(e.g., Lavie, 1995, 2005). In line with this, a few studies have
investigated whether efficient attention to task-irrelevant stimuli
was maintained regardless of cognitive resources in individu-
als with social anxiety (Moriya and Tanno, 2010, 2011; Moriya
and Sugiura, 2012). The results showed that high social anxious
(HSA) individuals did not inhibit the processing of task-irrelevant
stimuli under high perceptual load conditions, as would be pre-
dicted by the perceptual load theory (Lavie, 1995). However,
these studies only included non-emotional stimuli (e.g., letters).
Thus, it remains unseen whether socially threatening stimuli,
such as facial stimuli, which are particularly significant in SAD
(for a review, see Staugaard, 2010), would disrupt the enhanced
processing of task-irrelevant stimuli.
In the present study the purpose was to test whether processing
task-irrelevant emotional stimuli is enhanced in HSA individuals
(compared to low anxious individuals), even when perceptual
resources are fully engaged in a highly demanding primary task
(Forster and Lavie, 2008). Moreover, we aimed at investigating if
such interference effects of task-irrelevant stimuli are restricted to
threatening faces, compared to positive and neutral ones.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Fifty-four students (26 men and 28 women) from the University
of Aveiro, Portugal, aged between 18 and 56 years (M = 22.06;
SD = 5.58), volunteered to participate. Participants were divided
into high and low levels of anxiety and avoidance in social situ-
ations by using the Social Interaction and Performance Anxiety
and Avoidance Scale (SIPAAS; Pinto-Gouveia et al., 2003). This
scale comprises 44 items that represent performance and social
interaction situations (e.g., “Go to a party”, “Ask someone out”,
“Do an oral exam”, “Ask a stranger for information”). For each
situation, participants are asked to rate in a 4-point Likert scale
(1–4) the degree of discomfort/anxiety felt and the extent to which
they avoid that situation. This measure includes two subscales:
Discomfort/Anxiety and Avoidance, although we only used the
total score in the present study, which ranged from 88 to 352.
Twenty-seven participants were allocated in a HSA group
(M = 206.74; SD = 32.02) and 27 participants in a low social
anxious (LSA) group (M = 136.85; SD = 17.20). We used the
median split to divide the participants into the HSA and LSA
groups, with the scores in SIPAAS showing statistically significant
differences, t(52) = 9.99, p < 0.001. Importantly, this procedure
allowed for a direct comparison between our results and those
by Moriya and Tanno (2010), which we wanted to extend in the
present study. Participants also completed a Portuguese version
of the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961). However,
no significant differences were shown between groups regarding
their levels of depression, t(52) = 1.06, p > 0.05. The selection
procedure to create the HSA group resulted only in participants
with high levels of anxiety and avoidance of social situations,
but did not include a formal DSM-V (APA, 2013) diagnosis of
SAD. The participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
did not suffer from any mental or neurological illness and were
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medication free. Participants in both groupswerematched for age,
gender, and handedness.
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of Univer-
sity of Aveiro, Portugal and the guidelines of the Declaration of
Helsinki. Moreover, standards of American Psychological Associ-
ation were followed. Participation as subjects in the experiment
was based on written informed consent including the right to
abort participation at any time. Participants were rewarded with
course credits.
Equipment and Materials
All stimuli were presented against a white background. Target
stimuli consisted of a character (X or N). Non-target letters were
randomly chosen from G, H, K, J, S, Y. Participants were seated
40 cm from the screen. Target stimuli were presented around an
imaginary circle, with a 2.52° radius. All letters were presented
in font type “Lucida Console,” and were 0.5° in width and 0.5° in
height.
The task-irrelevant stimuli consisted of four male and four
female faces, selected from the Karolinska Directed Emo-
tional Faces (identity-numbers AF01, AF09, AF22, AF26, AM08,
AM10; AM17, AM29; Lundqvist et al., 1998, http://www.
facialstimuli.com/). Each individual displayed each of the follow-
ing emotional categories: negative (angry and disgust), positive
(happy), and neutral. The size of each face (i.e., task-irrelevant
distractor picture) was 6.45° in width by 6.46° in height, and were
displayed 9.45° from fixation to the center of the picture.
The task was programmed using the software E-prime 2.0
(Schneider et al., 2002) and the stimulus presentation was con-
ducted using a Dell OptiPlex 745 and an LG Flatron W2246
monitor with a 22-inch monitor. The monitor had a refresh rate
of 60 Hz. Participants used the letters X andN on the keyboard for
their responses.
Task and Procedure
After giving informed consent, participants were asked to find
a position in the chair where they could comfortably reach the
two response keys with their right and left index fingers. We
used a central task with brief stimulus duration (200 ms), where
participants had to decide, as quickly and accurately as possible,
the identity a designated target letter (X or N) presented at the
center of the display. The target letter was presented among five
“Os” (low perceptual load) on 50% of the total number of trials
or surrounded by five non-target letters—G, H, J, S, Y (high
perceptual load), arranged in a circular display (see Figure 1). The
position of the target letter surrounded fixation on every trial and
its presentation was randomized over the six possible positions.
Each trial started with the presentation of a black fixation cross
against a white background. The fixation cross was randomly
presented for 800 or 1200 ms, and immediately followed by the
stimulus display, after which a blank white response screen was
presented until the participants response. The intertrial interval
was 500 ms. On each trial, a task-irrelevant distractor image
depicting an angry, disgust, happy, or neutral face, was displayed
either to the left or to the right of fixation (equal probability). The
face stimulus was presented simultaneously with the stimulus dis-
play (Figure 1). The order of the perceptual load level and stimuli
FIGURE 1 | Sequence of the high (A) and low (B) perceptual load
conditions in the experiment.
(image distractor type, target letter, non-target letters) was fully
randomized for each participant (see Moriya and Tanno, 2011).
Participants initially completed 64 practice trials (16 for each facial
expression, equally distributed by the perceptual load level) with
accuracy feedback. None of the faces used in the practice was
shown in the main experiment. Practice trials were followed by
two blocks of experimental trials. Each block consisted of 288
trials, 144 for low and 144 for high load conditions (36 for each
face type: angry, disgust, happy, and neutral, in both low and high
load conditions). A participant-paced pause interval occurred
between each block.
Design and Statistical Analyses
The analysis of response times (RTs) excluded error trials and
outliers were removed by plotting the individual data points
(4.12%). Separate analyses were calculated for correct RT (ms)
and for proportion of response accuracy (%). Follow-up tests were
accomplished usingTukey’sHSDs (honest significant differences).
Significance levels were set at p < 0.05, and partial !2 (!2p) were
used as estimate of effect sizes.
A mixed effects repeated measures ANOVA was conducted
for both RT and accuracy, with perceptual load (low/high) and
distractor (neutral, happy, angry, disgust) as within-participants




The results showed a very robust main effect of perceptual load,
with slower overall RTs at high load (M = 647 ms; SD = 135 ms)
than at low load conditions (M = 525 ms; SD = 87 ms),
F(1,52) = 205.48, p < 0.0001, !2p = 0.80, thus confirming the
effectiveness of the perceptual load manipulation. The results
also revealed a two-way interaction between social anxiety and
perceptual load, F(1,52) = 5.62, p < 0.05, !2p = 0.10, showing
that only the HSA, in contrast with the LSA, had statistically
significantly longer RTs under the high load conditions (Tukey’s
HSD, p< 0.05), compared to the low load (Tukey’s HSD, p= 0.40;
Figure 2).
Finally, there was a main effect of social anxiety, showing that
RTs were significantly slower in the HSA group (M = 619 ms;
SD = 136 ms), compared to the LSA group (M = 553 ms;
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FIGURE 2 | Mean reaction times (RTs) in milliseconds (ms) to
discriminate the target letter (X or N) in the different perceptual load
conditions (low and high), as a function of the group (LSA, low social
anxiety; HSA, high social anxiety). Longer RTs indicate larger interference
scores. *p < 0.05.
SD = 111 ms;), F(1,52) = 5.57, p < 0.05, !2p = 0.10. No other
significant main effects or interactions were found.
Accuracy
The analysis of accuracy showed a main effect of perceptual
load, analogous to the effect in RTs, F(1,52) = 5.85, p < 0.05,
!2p = 0.10, with overall lower accuracy proportions at high
load (M = 0.92; SD = 0.07), compared to low load conditions
(M = 0.93; SD= 0.07). Moreover, the results revealed a three-way
interaction between social anxiety, face distraction and perceptual
load, F(3,156)= 4.97, p< 0.01, !2p = 0.09. HSA individuals, com-
pared LSA, showed higher accuracy in themain task (discriminate
the target letter), in the high perceptual load conditions, consis-
tently with the RT results. Moreover, while for LSA individuals
no differences in accuracy were shown for the different emotional
faces both in the low and high load conditions (Figure 3A), in the
HSA group, there was a statistically significant difference in the
post hoc Tukey’s tests for angry faces between the low and high
load conditions, showing a lower accuracy for angry faces in the
high load conditions (Tukey’s HSDs, p< 0.05; see Figure 3B).
No main effects of group (p= 0.90), distractor type (p= 0.83),
and no perceptual load by distractor type (p = 0.74), perceptual
load by group (p = 0.94), and distractor type by group (p = 0.44)
interactions were shown.
Discussion
Although some studies have investigated the effects of percep-
tual load in attentional control in trait anxious individuals (see
Berggren and Derakshan, 2013 for a review), far less research has
investigated such effects in social anxiety. Moreover, those few
studies only included non-emotional stimuli, such as letters or
natural scenes (Moriya and Tanno, 2010, 2011). In the present
study, we used emotional face stimuli, which are highly relevant to
social anxiety since they represent potent social cues and provide
important and direct feedback in social interactions (for a review,
see Staugaard, 2010). The aim of this study was to examine the




FIGURE 3 | (A) Mean accuracy proportions for the low social anxious to
discriminate the target letter (X or N) in the different perceptual load conditions
(low and high), as a function of the face distractor (neutral, happy, angry,
disgust). Lower accuracy proportions indicate larger interference scores.
(B) Mean accuracy proportions for the high social anxious to discriminate the
target letter (X or N) in the different perceptual load conditions (low and high),
as a function of the face distractor (neutral, happy, angry, disgust). Lower
accuracy proportions indicate larger interference scores.
attentional control processes in HSA, in comparison with LSA, by
using a target letter discrimination task (Forster and Lavie, 2008).
The results showed that, in general, HSA participants’ slowed
RT performance independently of the type of face stimuli valence.
This effect confirms previous findingswith non-emotional stimuli
showing that HSA are overall more prone to distraction by task-
irrelevant stimuli, independently of the perceptual demands of
the task (Moriya and Tanno, 2010, 2011). Importantly, this effect
was more pronounced under high perceptual load conditions,
thus pointing to an attentional control deficit in HSA participants,
which mirror that observed with trait anxiety (e.g., Eysenck et al.,
2007).
An additional interpretation of the increased RTs may involve
the fact that high HSA participants may have invested more
effort to solve the task (regardless of the type of distractors),
thus leading to higher accuracy rates. In fact, and concurrently
with the RTs, the accuracy results also showed that HSA were
overall more accurate in the main task than LSA participants,
although the main effect of group was not statistically significant.
Interestingly, however, differential effects of face type for HSA,
compared to LSA, were shown under high load conditions but not
in low load conditions. More specifically, for HSA, angry faces,
compared to the other emotional face categories, resulted in a
higher interference with the task (lower accuracy) under the high
load conditions.
Previous studies have shown that anxiety results in poorer effi-
ciency than effectiveness, i.e., anxious individuals are able to show
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high levels of performance, compared to low anxious individuals,
although this is achieved at the cost of an increased effort to bolster
deficits in attentional control (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992; Berggren
and Derakshan, 2013). Our study adds the notion that both effi-
ciency and effectiveness are hampered, particularly in socially
anxious and when the task-irrelevant stimuli display a threatening
content (angry or disgust faces, although the only statistically
significant effect was observed for angry faces). Although this is
effect may be in part due to the higher performance in the high
anxiety group during the low load condition, it was specifically
observed in the HSA group, who seemed to have been able to
efficiently ignore the distractors under the low perceptual load
conditions.
Angry faces represent a form of human hostility of the beholder
and, therefore, have served as an important threat signal through-
out evolution (see Öhman, 2009; Öhman et al., 2012 for a review).
Thus, based on its deep evolutionary origin, they are processed
rapidly and efficiently with only minimal analysis of the stim-
ulus input (LeDoux, 2000). In addition, the social fear systems
are at the core of SAD (APA, 2013), with a potentiated auto-
matic attentional orienting to angry threat as a natural result in
social anxious individuals (see the meta-analysis by Bar-Haim
et al., 2007). Congruently, our study provided indications that
the hampered effectiveness for angry faces was only observed
in individuals prone to display social anxiety and avoidance of
social interactions, i.e., with a pre-existing attentional bias to
threat in faces. Thus, perceptual load (or task demands) seemed
to influence the compensatory strategies used by social anxious
individuals to overcome their attentional control deficits. Indeed,
several studies have found empirical evidence for the notion that
anxiety interferes with top-down attentional control (Bishop et al.,
2004, 2007; Bishop, 2007).
One of the central features of cognitive models of anxiety,
such as the one proposed by Rapee and Heimberg (1997), is
the automatic nature of processing disorder-related stimuli (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007), even in conditions where perceptual resources
are depleted and would not be appropriate to pursue a deep cogni-
tive analysis (LeDoux, 2000). Hence, the results from the present
study showed that even under exhausted cognitive resources,
threat biases in social anxiety seemed to operate at early stages of
information processing (200 ms; e.g., Mogg et al., 2004; Miskovic
and Schmidt, 2012). Such threat bias to angry faces inhibited the
performance in the main task under high load conditions, thus
resulting in lower accuracy in letter discrimination when angry
faces were presented as task-irrelevant stimuli. This reflects that
the strategies to compensate the attentional control deficits in
HSA did not seem to effectively cover angry faces under load,
when additional attentional resources needed to be recruited,
contrary to several pervasive findings with trait anxious indi-
viduals (e.g., Berggren et al., 2013; but see Ladouceur et al.,
2009).
Finally, and in contrast with a wealth of research, our results did
not show a threat bias at low load conditions in HSA (for similar
findings, see, e.g., Berggren et al., 2013). This result is consistent
with the ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007), which predicts that at low
load anxious individuals tend to consume additional attentional
resources to compensate for attentional control deficits, thus leav-
ing no differential effects between emotions (e.g., Sadeh and Bre-
demeier, 2011). The processing of emotional relevant stimuli (e.g.,
snakes and angry faces) is known to be prioritized independently
of the attentional conditions, such as the foveal or peripheral
presentation in the visual field, as it enables safe avoidance or
escape (e.g., Öhman et al., 2012; Soares et al., 2014), which moti-
vated the peripheral presentation of the task-irrelevant stimuli
in the peripheral visual field. However, studies have also showed
that face stimuli are preferentially processed in central vision
(e.g., Holmes et al., 2006). Thus, we suggest that future research
investigates whether the overall lack of differences between the
different emotional faces in the present study, particularly in the
low load conditions, is maintained when the face stimuli are
presented foveally. Moreover, and given the role of motivation in
attentional control deficits in anxiety (Berggren and Derakshan,
2013), additional studies should also investigate if this factor could
have interacted with the perceptual load manipulations.
The present study provides a further insight in the understand-
ing of social anxiety by examining how perceptual load impairs
attentional control to distractor emotional faces in social anxious
individuals. The ability to control the focus of attention is an
evolutionary relevant behavior (Gilboa-Schechtman and Shachar-
Lavie, 2013), as well as an important social tool for social interac-
tion regulation (Gilbert et al., 2009) and should, therefore, deserve
further research.
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